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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a simple method for evaluating adversarial risk within the transporta-
tion portion of the nuclear fuel cycle for commercial electric power generation, and de-
velops models that can guide the reduction of that risk by such means as rerouting and
decoy shipments. A conceivable, worst-case attack by an intelligent adversary will cause
a localized release of radioactive material. A damage function is defined using the popu-
lation in the vicinity of the attack. Using hypothetical, but realistic, transit routes between
fuel fabricators and power plants, we identify the worst-case locations for attack. Then we
formulate and solve mixed-integer programs to either (a) redesign the network by chang-
ing supply contracts, or (b) optimally allocate a resource-constrained assignment of de-
coy shipments. We also demonstrate a greedy procedure for simple rerouting of individual
shipments. Computational methods exploit standard geographical databases, and optimiza-
tion software solves the models in seconds on a personal computer. Separate but similar
analyses would apply to shipments of uranium hexafluoride, spent fuel being shipped for
reprocessing, spent fuel being shipped to a repository, and other materials.
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Executive Summary
This thesis develops a simple method for evaluating adversarial risk within the transporta-
tion portion of the nuclear fuel cycle for commercial electric power generation, and devel-
ops models that can guide the reduction of that risk by such means as rerouting and decoy
shipments. The research focuses on the U.S. fuel cycle, but the methods developed are
flexible enough to handle current and future fuel cycles around the world. “Adversarial
risk” measures the potential danger posed by an intelligent adversary who might (a) attack
a shipment and steal material to to be used in an improvised nuclear device, or (b) attack a
shipment with one or more explosive devices and cause a direct release of dangerous ma-
terials into the environment, or (c) hijack a shipment, move it to a new location, and then
release some of the contents into the environment.
“Adversarial” covers conceivable, worst-case attacks by an intelligent adversary. Stealing
dangerous material from a shipment is almost inconceivable given the safeguards in ship-
ping and the great bulk of the containers used for shipping uranium hexafluoride, fresh
nuclear fuel, and spent nuclear fuel. Therefore, we do not consider case (a). Further-
more, we do not view the theft of yellowcake as a serious threat since it must undergo a
complicated enrichment process before becoming dangerous. On the other hand, a litera-
ture review indicates that a terrorist organization, using weapons and methods that may lie
within that organization’s reach, could strike a shipment of nuclear material successfully;
enough material could be released to inflict substantial physical and economic damage. A
hijacking attack appears much less likely to succeed, but our methods extend to analyze
such scenarios.
Both rail and truck shipments are subject to adversarial risks. We limit most discussion and
development to truck shipments, however, because the thesis’s methods carry over from
truck to rail shipments in a straightforward fashion.
Focusing on directs attacks (b), we note that any existing “damage function” for a worst-
case attack will yield monotonically increasing values as a function of the total population
affected, namely, the population in a model-defined area surrounding a shipping route.
This monotonicity allows us to use population in an area around a point on a transportation
xv
route as a surrogate for the “true damage” that would accrue from an attack at that point.
The surrogate then generates the objective function for several game-theoretic models for
minimizing adversarial risk or expected adversarial risk.
To illustrate, we use hypothetical but realistic data to evaluate adversarial risk for fresh-fuel
shipments in the United States, and show how to (a) minimize adversarial risk by redesign-
ing the network so that shipments travel through areas that would be “less risky,” or (b)
minimize expected adversarial risk by a resource-constrained assignment of decoy ship-
ments. “Redesign” in (a) could mean renegotiating supply contracts or simply rerouting
individual shipments. Depending on problem specifics, optimization of these “defender-
attacker models” is achieved by solving an integer program or by applying a simple greedy
procedure. Separate but similar analyses would apply to shipments of uranium hexafluo-
ride, spent fuel being shipped for reprocessing, spent fuel being shipped to a repository,
and other materials.
Because a simple surrogate risk measure applies for adversarial risk analysis, data require-
ments are modest. Furthermore, computational methods exploit standard geographical
databases and optimization software. Again focusing on fresh-fuel transportation, com-
putations provide results of the following form:
1. Under reasonable constraints, renegotiation of fuel supplies (i.e., supplier-to-power-
plant assignments) could reduce the risk surrogate by g%. Furthermore, a linear
relationship between the surrogate and actual damage might be reasonably assumed,
so actual risk might be reduced by g%, also.
2. Without rerouting, expected risk for fresh-fuel shipments can be reduced by h%
through the use of decoy shipments with a total mileage limit of m miles per year.
xvi
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The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and others are concerned with the risk of “damage”
from an attack on the transportation portion of a commercial nuclear fuel cycle, domestic
or foreign [1]. This thesis develops and demonstrates a general model for (a) evaluating
this “adversarial risk” and (b) minimizing this risk subject to resource constraints.
An attack could involve the destruction of a shipment of feedstock and the exposure of
a local population to a toxic and/or radioactive substance, or it could involve the theft
of material that would be converted into a fission or nuclear-dispersion weapon, and then
unleashed upon a population. Damage might involve only bad publicity, although this could
have a substantial economic effect on the industry. But, the possibility exists that damage
would mean the loss of thousands of lives from the explosion of, say, a nuclear-dispersion
device.
This thesis creates a surrogate model for evaluating adversarial risk and applies that to
create the objective function for several new game-theoretic risk-reduction models. Using
realistic but notional data, we demonstrate with several examples. For example, given
that “risk of damage” from an attack on a given shipment increases monotonically with
the population that might be affected, we show how a cardinality-restricted set of origin-
destination pairs might be modified to minimize risk.
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the nuclear fuel cycle, with
a focus on the transportation of nuclear material between facilities. Chapter 3 develops a
general model for evaluating adversarial risk in this context. Chapter 4 describes the trans-
portation “subnetworks” that may be analyzed individually for adversarial risk, for exam-
ple, the subnetwork that ships fresh-fuel assemblies. Then, using realistic but notional data,
Chapter 5 demonstrates use of the adversarial-risk model by analyzing the “fresh-fuel sub-
network.” Chapter 6 describes a generic, game-theoretic, defender-attacker model, which
seeks to design a minimum-risk subnetwork subject to resource constraints. This extends
to modifying existing networks to minimize risk, which is demonstrated for the fresh-fuel
1
network. Chapter 7 describes a general optimization model for assigning decoy shipments
to reduce expected adversarial risk; again the fresh-fuel subnetwork is used to demonstrate.




BACKGROUND: TRANSPORTATION IN THE
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
This chapter explains the transportation portion of a commercial nuclear fuel cycle, with a
focus on the U.S. This provides important background for developing and demonstrating a
useful model of adversarial risk.
In its simplest form, the nuclear fuel cycle in the U.S. consists of several stages for prepar-
ing, consuming, and disposing of nuclear material. Figure 2.1 depicts the basic processing
steps in current and future fuel cycles, and the flow of material between these steps. Each
of the steps requires specialized equipment, often located in standalone facilities. Thus,
nuclear materials must be transported between facilities to proceed through some process-
ing steps. Focusing on transportation, we can understand the overall nuclear fuel cycle as a
supply chain that transports material from its “raw” form to “finished product” to “waste.”
1. Mining and Milling. Uranium ore is mined or removed from the earth in a leaching
process.
2. Conversion (1). Triuranium octoxide (U3O8, “yellowcake”) is converted into ura-
nium hexafluoride (UF6) for subsequent enrichment.
3. Enrichment. UF6 is processed, removing 238U to to increase the percentage of fissile
235U. This process typically involves a gaseous centrifuge, but a number of tech-
niques are known, such as the “separation of isotopes by laser excitation” (SILEX)
process, which has been licensed recently [2].
Note: Public information on the SILEX process indicates that it uses UF6 as a feed-
stock. Thus, the overall physical structure of the supply chain may not change under
SILEX enrichment. This may not be true with the earlier “atomic vapor laser isotope
separation” (AVLIS) process, which may still be viable, at least outside the U.S. This
process uses vaporized uranium as feedstock [3].
4. Conversion (2). Enriched UF6 is converted into (enriched) uranium dioxide (UO2),
which is then fired into ceramic pellets for placement in fuel rods.
3






Wet storage  
Dry storage 
Reprocessing Interim storage Repository 
Many sites,  U.S. and elsewhere 
1 U.S. site 
2 U.S. sites 
3 U.S. sites 






Figure 2.1: Transportation in the nuclear fuel cycle. Solid dark arrows represent movement
of nuclear material between facilities in the current U.S. fuel cycle; the light-shaded solid arrow
shows a movement that could involve transportation in a non-U.S. cycle. Dashed arrows represent
potential transportation of nuclear material in future fuel cycles. Many shipments of spent fuel
have occurred in the U.S., but these have been on an ad hoc basis (e.g., to consolidate storage
for a single power producer). These shipments have not been part of an operating fuel cycle [4],
as they have been in other countries.
5. Fabrication. Fuel rods are constructed from enriched uranium pellets, and gathered
into the bundles that make up a fuel assembly, as used in power-plant reactors.
6. Irradiation. Complete fuel assemblies are installed in a power reactor, and controlled
nuclear fission is initiated for the purpose of generating electric power.
7. On-site storage. Once a fuel assembly has reached the end of its useful life, it is
removed and placed into on-site wet-waste storage. Here, it cools over many months
until it can be dried and placed into semi-permanent dry-waste storage. Eventually,
dry-waste must be sent to a permanent repository or recycled, but on-site dry storage
is the current end of the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle.
8. Reprocessing. Spent fuel can be reprocessed to concentrate certain radioisotopes.
This concentrated material would then be sent to conversion and fabrication facilities
where it would become part of new fuel assemblies. Material from nuclear weapons
4
can be “reprocessed” in a similar fashion to provide reactor fuel.
9. Interim storage. It is possible that a non-permanent storage facility would be created
to store dry waste from one or more nuclear power plants. This would allow power
plants whose on-site storage has reached capacity to continue operating, even though
no permanent repository had been built.
10. Repository. Waste material from an interim storage site or from a power plant’s dry-
waste storage would be transported to a permanent storage site (i.e., a repository).
Yucca Mountain was intended to be such a repository [5].
Only a few facilities in the United States perform the processing steps described above.
Figure 2.2 displays the locations of the processing facilities currently in the U.S. The
ultimate consumers of nuclear fuel are reactor facilities that generate electricity. Figure
2.3 displays the locations and ages of the nuclear reactors currently operating in the U.S.
Together, these figures should give the reader an idea of the geographical scope of the














































Figure 2.3: Commercial nuclear power reactors operating in the U.S. as of July 2013.
For simplicity, the rest of the thesis focuses on shipments of nuclear material through a
truck shipping network. All of our methods apply also to rail networks and combined




This chapter outlines our method for evaluating “adversarial risk.” Adversarial risk mea-
sures the potential danger posed by an intelligent adversary that executes a conceivable,
worst-case attack on a target of interest.
3.1 A Basic Model of Risk
To build an adversarial model for the transportation of nuclear materials, consider a subset
of the overall transportation network: shipping of fresh fuel (by truck) from assembly
plants to nuclear reactors. In this subnetwork, the material being shipped is reasonably
homogeneous as are the transportation containers, which are fresh-fuel casks in this case.
Fresh-fuel assemblies may not be the most dangerous material that is shipped within the
nuclear fuel cycle, but the fresh-fuel subnetwork is large and diverse, and it is easy to
manipulate for purposes of demonstration. The methods also apply to other transportation
subnetworks, such as shipping enriched uranium, mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, and spent fuel.
In an adversarial model, we use “risk” to measure the worst conceivable outcome [6]. A
survey of the literature provides two key observations:
Observation 1: Any shipment of nuclear materials could be attacked “successfully,” that
is, to yield a direct release of a substantial quantity of nuclear material into the environment
[7–9].
Observation 2: Damage (bad publicity, deaths and injuries from chemical and radiation
exposure) would be positively correlated with total population in the area in which the
material is released [10–12]. It is also clear that cleanup costs would depend strongly on
population numbers [13].
Note 1: Lamb and Resnikoff [13] examine a worst-case accident for spent fuel—this worst-
case accident is no worse than a worst-case attack—and estimates a cleanup cost in an urban
setting at over $13 billion. Fresh fuel would not require such extensive cleanup because
7
of lower levels of radioactivity, but we have not discovered any research that provides cost
estimates.
Numerous authors propose the identification of minimum-risk hazardous material
(HAZMAT) routes using minimum-cost routing techniques with cost defined as a function
of the number of people that might be affected by an accident along a route (e.g., [14–16]).
For example, one cost function, applied to the whole route, evaluates expected conse-
quence, which is defined as the “population at risk” along the route multiplied by the
probability that an accident occurs along that route. Population at risk may be defined
as the total population within a certain distance of the route, perhaps inversely weighted
by actual distance from the route. ReVelle [16] refers to this general idea as “tons-past-
people.” Because our focus is a worst-case attack by an intelligent adversary, we use nei-
ther probabilities nor total population at risk in creating a “cost function,” but rather, use
the maximum population that might be affected along a route.
For any point location ` ∈ L in the relevant subnetwork s, we apply Observations 1 and 2
to define adversarial risk in an abstract fashion:
risks` ≈ fs(pop`), (3.1)
where pop` is the the total population in some to-be-defined region around location `, and
where fs(·) is a monotonically increasing function of population. For an exact measure
of risk (e.g., number of deaths, years of cleanup, dollars required for cleanup) the ana-
lyst would consult with the references cited above, other existing literature, or develop a
problem-specific definition.
Because adversarial risk measures a worst-case outcome, the total risk associated with






Thus, in a static situation, for a given subnetwork, we need only focus on the peak pop-
ulation through which shipments move. How that population is measured will depend on
the type of material, but the measurement method should be standard for subnetwork s
8
(through which homogeneous materials are shipped in homogeneous containers).
Note 2: Population is key here because that is what we may have effective control over. For
example, by rerouting fuel shipments, the population that might be affected by an attack
can change. But then, how can we reduce risk by, say, reducing the quantity of material in
a shipment? Without rerouting, population stays the same, the worst-case accident would
occur in the same location, and we simply need to apply a different damage function to
evaluate risk numerically.




After evaluating risk in a subnetwork, we look for ways to reduce that risk. Risk mitiga-
tion for transportation should begin with smax. Suppose that we determine that currently, in
the U.S., smax corresponds to fresh-fuel shipments. We assume that these shipments can-
not be made invulnerable to attack, and that reducing their size is impracticable. Splitting
single shipments into many smaller shipments would reduce adversarial risk, but might in-
crease accident risk and would require major physical changes in reactors and the refueling
process. Consequently, the obvious leverage we have is to reroute shipments through ar-
eas with smaller populations. This proposition, which follows from monotonicity of fs(·),
makes solving risk-mitigation problems simple:
Proposition 1: When minimizing adversarial risk within a single subnetwork, maximum
population along a link k in that subnetwork may be used as a surrogate for risk on that
link.
Let G= (N,A) denote a generic network consisting of nodes N and directed or undi-
rected links A. To illustrate a basic risk-mitigation model, suppose that for subnetwork
s, Ghs = (Ns,A
h
s ), h= 1, . . . ,H, defines H designs that are under consideration as replace-
ments for the current subnetwork G0s = (Ns,A
0
s ). The best design, with respect to adversar-
9






where popk is the maximum population observed along a defined region around link k
(for example, a circle centered at a point on the route and encompassing 20 km2). In
the following chapters, this basic concept lets us develop several methods for minimizing
adversarial risk by using decoys or changing a network’s design.
3.2 Other Models of Adversarial Risk
Other models of risk have been proposed for use in the context of terrorist attacks. We
describe two here and point out some of their pitfalls, both in general and in the setting of
this thesis.
3.2.1 Probabilistic Risk Analysis
A complex model for evaluating adversarial risk might consider, for instance, the sequence
of actions that make up an attack—steal a missile of type A in a foreign country, smuggle
a missile of type A into the United States, launch the missile at the target, etc.—each with
some probability of success and leading to an overall probability of success. One can
also assign probability distributions on the amount of material that would be released for
each possible weapon type and the direction and strength of the wind at the time of the
attack. Such analysis is classified as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), and PRA has
been suggested for “terrorism risk analysis” [17, 18].
The difficulties with such models are well known, for example (a) they place static prob-
ability distributions on dynamic human decision making and thereby violate the tenets of
game theory, (b) they typically rely on a great deal of “data” derived from subjective esti-
mates from subject matter experts (SMEs), and (c) these data may require enormous effort
to obtain and maintain and have uncertain quality [19, 20]. By contrast, our models derive
from simple physical models and make minimal assumptions. In our opinion, a complete
worst-case analysis should be carried out and be found wanting before attempting to im-
prove that analysis through probabilistic methods.
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3.2.2 Attack Difficulty
In a study led by the Sandia National Laboratories, Cipiti et al. apply the Risk-Informed
Management of Enterprise Security (RIMES) technique to analyze possible attack scenar-
ios on a small modular reactor [21]. This technique seeks to categorize attacks in terms
of their difficulty to execute, and then to assess risk by comparing “attack difficulty” with
“potential attacker capability.”
Cipiti et al. consider 13 dimensions of attack difficulty on a small modular reactor (grouped
into two categories: attack preparation and attack execution), and for each of these 13
dimensions they divide difficulty into five levels, with level 1 being the easiest and level 5
the most difficult. For each potential attack, they use the opinions of one or more SMEs to
specify the level of difficulty in each of the 13 dimensions. The overall risk then depends on
additional SME assessments as to whether any of a set of potential attackers could succeed
in overcoming the difficulty level identified in each dimension.
This technique may not require the explicit use of subjective probabilities, and may there-
fore appear to sidestep some of the criticism of PRA. Nonetheless, it requires at least
one SME to assess linearly scaled “difficulty numbers" that (a) are clearly subjective, (b)
may be impossible to validate, and that (c) impose a substantial data-collection and data-
maintenance burden on the model’s user. By contrast, our models are designed to require
little or no subjective input data from SMEs and, although our models can require large
amounts of input data (routing and population data), no intrinsic difficulties arise in col-
lecting and maintaining these data.
11
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
12
CHAPTER 4:
SUBNETWORKS IN THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
FUEL CYCLE
This thesis demonstrates adversarial-risk evaluation and adversarial-risk reduction only for
the fabricator-to-power-plant subnetwork, or “fresh-fuel subnetwork,” within the domestic
nuclear fuel cycle. The models apply, however, to any subnetwork that ships a single com-
modity (e.g., unenriched UF6). Several “single-commodity subnetworks” can be combined
for analysis into a single “multicommodity subnetwork,” but this may only make sense if
the commodities involved have similar levels of danger associated with them. For example,
supposing that unenriched and enriched UF6 have similar levels of toxicity, then, reducing
adversarial risk for the “enriched UF6 subnetwork” might have little effect if the risk asso-
ciated with the “unenriched UF6 subnetwork” were left unchanged. In this case, the two
subnetworks should be combined for analysis.
For completeness, we list the single-commodity subnetworks in the U.S. that are relevant
now, or may become relevant in the future:
1. Yellowcake: This subnetwork includes as its origin nodes various ports of entry
and production plants in Wyoming, Nebraska, Utah, Colorado, and Texas. Only
Honeywell’s Metropolis Works (MTW) facility in Metropolis, Illinois, performs the
initial conversion of yellowcake to UF6, so Metropolis defines the single terminal
node in this subnetwork.
2. Unenriched UF6: This simple subnetwork runs from MTW in Metropolis, Illinois,
to United States Enrichment Corporation’s (USEC) gaseous diffusion plant in Padu-
cah, Kentucky, and URENCO USA’s gas centrifuge enrichment plant in Eunice, New
Mexico.
3. Enriched UF6: This subnetwork extends from USEC in Paducah, Kentucky, and
URENCO in Eunice, New Mexico, to three nuclear fuel fabrication facilities: Areva,
Inc., in Richland, Washington (Areva); Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, LLC, in
Wilmington, North Carolina (GNF); and Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, in
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Columbia, South Carolina (Westinghouse).
4. Fresh fuel: This subnetwork extends from the three fuel fabricators to the nuclear
power plants that burn the fuel, and is described in detail elsewhere in this thesis.
Actually, fresh-fuel shipments in the U.S. also include fuel assemblies that are fab-
ricated in the U.S. and shipped to overseas customers [22]. This thesis does not
consider such shipments, but a complete adversarial risk analysis for fresh-fuel ship-
ments in the U.S. certainly should.
5. Spent fuel: For the most part, spent-fuel shipments in the U.S. domestic fuel cycle
have been limited to moving spent fuel for the purpose of consolidating a company’s
intermediate storage [23]. In the future, any of the following single-commodity sub-
networks or combinations thereof could be relevant:
(a) Dry casks of spent fuel shipped from power plants to intermediate storage.
(b) Dry casks shipped from power plants and/or intermediate storage to one or more
final repositories.
(c) Dry casks shipped from power plants to one or more reprocessing facilities.
6. Other materials being reprocessed: This could include military warheads, domes-
tic or foreign, being processed into fuel (e.g., the “Megatons to Megawatts” pro-
gram [24]), and spent fuel brought into the United States from foreign countries for
reprocessing.
7. Waste from reprocessing: If reprocessing becomes relevant, it will generate dry-
cask shipments to intermediate storage and/or final repository [25].
The appendix provides more detail on existing subnetworks, but the remainder of the body
of the thesis focuses on the fresh-fuel subnetwork.
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CHAPTER 5:
EVALUATING ADVERSARIAL RISK OR ITS
SURROGATE FOR A SUBNETWORK
Because the materials of interest in this thesis are hazardous, these materials typically travel
along pre-approved, static routes. It therefore makes sense to evaluate the adversarial risk
associated with a static transportation link k of a particular subnetwork s. Following the
discussion in the previous chapter, we use this surrogate:
dk = the maximum population that might be affected by an attack on link k (5.1)
in subnetwork s,
where s is omitted as a subscript because the subnetwork is fixed. This admittedly vague
definition will be made more precise, later. To avoid confusion, we call dk the “damage
surrogate” or “damage value.”
Note 3: The terms “route” and “link” will be used interchangeably but, strictly speaking, a
link between two nodes is the abstraction of the complicated route that moves between two
fuel-cycle facilities along roads and past, potentially, many areas of population.
5.1 Damage Values for a “Direct Attack”
Suppose that we determine that a simple, “direct attack” is the key threat: a shipment is
attacked with an explosive device of some type, and some of its contents are released into
the environment.
The area affected by a direct attack would depend on the material, the amount released,
meteorological conditions, etc., but we must focus on a worst case: the discussion and
references in Chapter 3 indicate that, in the worst case, most of a shipment’s material could
be vaporized and released into the environment. Depending on dispersion-plume models
(e.g., Harper et al. [26], Reshetin [27]), we may assume that material will affect all people
within a certain radius of a release site. (A more detailed model might look for the largest
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population affected if the plume expands centrally, or moves in any particular compass
direction.) Then, to compute dk, we only need to extrapolate census data to points along
the corresponding route, and then choose the largest population identified. Using a grid of
population cells, our numerical examples use a cruder method to estimate these numbers,
but the reader will see that the estimates produced give intuitively sensible results in all
tested models.
We begin with a grid of population values divided into latitude-longitude quadrilaterals that
are 2.5 arc-minutes on a side [28]. Each quadrilateral (grid cell) has an area of 21.4 km2
at the equator, which reduces to about 14 km2 in the southern U.S. and to about 11 km2 in
the northern U.S. This is true since the width of a cell reduces by a factor of (90− lat)/90
where “lat” is latitude north in decimal degrees. For simplicity, we assume that an attack
would affect the population in a single grid cell of the size seen at the equator. For cells at
other latitudes then, we multiply cell population by a correction factor of 90/(90− lat) to
enable an equal-basis comparison. Finally, to determine the damage value dk for a given
link k , we simply identify the cell with the largest (adjusted) population that intersects the
corresponding route. Table 5.1 shows the 10 links with the largest damage values for the
hypothetical U.S. fresh-fuel network.
A single grid-square area (11 to 14 km2) might be too conservative for some nuclear mate-
rials. Suppose an appropriate area is roughly nine times the single-cell area. Then, we only
need to expand the area of interest to the nine cells that make up the 3×3 block of cells
about each relevant point. Table 5.2 shows these values. The top 10 damage values and
locations do not change much from Table 5.1, indicating that that the damage surrogate
is not particularly sensitive to the data. The biggest difference is that Bronx is now the
worst case, corresponding to a shipment that passes through Newark, crosses the George
Washington Bridge, and continues into Connecticut, using Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) the
whole time. (Of course, we do not know if this route is actually used.) The smaller Newark
damage value represents a shipment that crosses the same bridge and then turns north, up
I-87, rather than continuing on through the eastern Bronx on I-95.
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Table 5.1: The 10 largest damage values and their locations given (a) a direct attack, and (b)
the affected population resides in only a single population cell. The related number of affected
routes and reactors is also given. For example, nine routes traverse a single location near Chicago,
Illinois, where the population data imply a damage value of 261787; those nine routes feed 15
reactors.
Location Damage Routes Reactors
value dk
(nearest city) (persons) (number) (number)
Chicago, IL 261787 9 15
Newark, NJ 225895 4 5
Philadelphia, PA 218745 1 1
Washington, DC 184547 4 7
Milwaukee, WI 115225 1 2
Buffalo, NY 103012 1 1
Phoenix, AZ 92792 1 3
Cleveland, OH 78211 1 1
Lincoln, NE 78121 8 15
Chicago, IL (suburbs) 72781 1 2
Table 5.2: The 10 largest damage values for an attack that occurs in a given cell and affects that
cell along with the eight adjacent cells. See the caption for Table 5.1 for additional information.
Location Damage Routes Reactors
value dk
(nearest city) (persons) (number) (number)
Bronx, NY 2388125 4 5
Chicago, IL 1881620 8 13
Newark, NJ 1219373 1 2
Philadelphia, PA 1172064 1 1
Washington, DC 971233 4 7
Milwaukee, WI 804469 1 2
Phoenix, AZ 666934 1 3
Buffalo, NY 661251 1 1
Cleveland, OH 631157 1 1
Chicago, IL (suburbs) 563459 1 2
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5.2 Damage Values for a “Hijacking Attack”
We believe that hijacking a nuclear shipment in the U.S. and moving it any substantial
distance would be extremely difficult, given that each shipment is guarded, heavy contain-
ers are difficult to move, radio contact or the lack thereof with a hijacked truck should
quickly alert authorities of an incident, and that truck or trailer should be easily located and
immobilized. Nonetheless, our methods enable consideration of a hijacking scenario.
We assume that it is impossible for a hijacking to go unnoticed, so it is also reasonable
to assume that a hijacked truck would be stopped within some short time period, say 30
minutes, after an attack is begun. We assume that a worst-case release of the shipment’s
contents would then take place. Thus, to evaluate the damage value for a subnetwork link k,
we only need to expand the search for a “worst-case population cell” (or “group of cells”)
along the route to include the distance that a truck could cover in 30 minutes from any point
on link k. This could be estimated accurately using road-network and population data, but
for demonstration purposes we use a simpler method: assuming again that a release of
material would affect only the population in a single cell, we identify the largest population
cell within 48.3 km (30 miles) of the route using a straight-line distance calculation. This
method yields the damage values displayed in Table 5.3 for the hypothetical fresh-fuel
subnetwork described above.
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Table 5.3: For a hijacking attack, the 10 largest damage values and their locations. A shipment
hijacked on the hypothetical route from Westinghouse to Braidwood is farther than 30 miles from
the peak population area of Chicago, Illinois, and a hijacked truck could only reach the suburbs
to the south of the Chicago under assumed conditions.
Location Damage Routes Reactors
value dk
(nearest city) (persons) (number) (number)
Bronx, NY 689338 5 7
Chicago, IL 261787 11 19
Philadelphia, PA 218745 4 6
Washington, DC 184547 3 5
Miami, FL 148941 1 2
New Orleans, LA 120858 3 4
Cleveland, OH 112760 1 1
Detroit, MI 111900 1 1
Chicago, IL (suburbs) 110753 1 2
Pittsburgh, PA 109837 2 3
5.3 Reducing Adversarial Risk
The damage-surrogate models above provide objective means of comparing the adversarial
risk associated with different routes or scenarios. The next two chapters show how to apply
limited resources to reduce risk optimally assuming monotonicity of “true damage” as as
function of damage value (as described in Chapter 3). Any of the optimization models
could be applied to any subnetwork once an appropriate damage-surrogate is defined. We
demonstrate the models on the fresh-fuel subnetwork using the damage surrogate reflected
in Table 5.1. An attack at a particular point would affect the population in its respective
grid square.
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CHAPTER 6:
DA1: A GENERAL DEFENDER-ATTACKER
MODEL FOR REDUCING ADVERSARIAL RISK IN
A TRANSPORTATION SUBNETWORK
This chapter presents a generic mathematical-programming model that uses the damage
surrogate to minimize adversarial risk in a transportation subnetwork. The model applies
to network design, redesign, modification, and rerouting of certain shipments, all subject
to generic resource constraints. We describe the general model in terms of building a sub-
network from scratch, but explain how it applies in the other situations, which are probably
more likely to arise in practice (e.g., redesign or simple modifications).
6.1 A General Model: DA1
We assume that a defender (fuel-cycle “operators,” transporters, regulators, etc.) faces a
single adversary or attacker, who plans on carrying out a single attack in the transportation
system. The defender will build the network, the attacker will observe what has been
built and then attack in the most destructive way possible when seen from the viewpoint
of the defender. This is a two-stage Stackelberg game, called a “defender-attacker” (DA)
model, as described in Brown et al. [6]. The worst-case analysis is pessimistic for the
defender—will an attacker really be able to carry out a worst-case attack?—but it is prudent.
We refer the reader to Brown et al. [6], Scaparra and Church [29], Brown et al. [30],
Alderson et al. [31], and the references therein for other applications of DA models or
the related defender-attacker-defender (DAD) models to problems of infrastructure design
and/or defense.
A solution to the following model will identify a minimum-risk subnetwork in which each
origin node is connected uniquely to a source and subject to capacity constraints at each
origin node and each destination node. Consequently, the subnetwork is bipartite. Such a
model could be used, for example, to design a fabricator-to-power-plant subnetwork from
scratch. But, it could also be used to make a limited number of changes to an existing sub-
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network to reduce risk, or to guide rerouting decisions. Note that the capacity constraints
may simplify greatly in most applications. For instance, in the fresh-fuel subnetwork, the
capacity constraints at a destination node (i.e., at a power plant) may simplify to “Attach
exactly one source (i.e., fuel fabricator) to this power plant.”
The network models here differ from those described in traditional capacitated network
design; for example, see Magnanti and Wong [32] and the references therein. Such designs
typically use binary variables to represent construction of a network and continuous vari-
ables to represent activities that may use the constructed network’s capacity. For example,
∑
h
rhkyhk ≤ r¯kxk; xk ∈ {0,1}; yhk ≥ 0 ∀ h where rhk > 0 ∀ h
might imply that if link k is constructed (xk = 1), then the sum of all activities h, converted to
a common unit of measurement (∑h rhkyhk) must not exceed the constructed capacity of the
link which is r¯k. But if the link is not constructed (xk = 0), then no activities may take place
on that link at all because∑h rhkyhk≤ 0. By contrast, one of our model’s “constructed links”
k is not a physical link, but essentially a contract for a fixed level of activity, for example,
the shipping of u fuel assemblies each year between a fabricator and a nuclear power plant.
The creation of this link tells us exactly the amount of resource that will be consumed at
the fabricator for instance (i.e., u). Thus, the model presented below incorporates binary
“link-construction variables” xk without any continuous “link activity variables.”
Indices and Index Sets
i ∈ NS origin nodes in a bipartite subnetwork
j ∈ NT destination nodes in a bipartite subnetwork; NS∩NT = /0
i, j ∈ N all nodes in a bipartite subnetwork; N = NS∪NT
k ∈ A links a subnetwork; k = (i, j) where i ∈ NS, j ∈ NT
i(k), j(k) respectively, the origin and destination nodes for link k ∈ A
G= (N,A) the bipartite subnetwork, also written as G= (NS,NT ,A)
k ∈ AS(i) links directed out of node i ∈ NS
k ∈ AT ( j) links directed into node j ∈ NT
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r ∈ R resource types
Data
dk damage surrogate for link k ∈ A
uSir, u¯
S
ir respectively, the minimum and maximum allowable capacity utilization for
resource r at i ∈ NS
uTjr, u¯
T
jr respectively, the minimum and maximum allowable capacity utilization for
resource r at j ∈ NT
uSkr capacity utilization of resource r at i given that k ∈ AS(i) is selected
uTkr capacity utilization of resource r at j given that k ∈ AT ( j) is selected
Variables
xk 1 if the new network design includes link k, and 0 otherwise
z maximum of damage surrogates across all links
Formulation
DA1 : min z (6.1)
s.t. z−dkxk ≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ A (6.2)
uSir ≤ ∑
k∈AS(i)
uSkrxk ≤ u¯Sir ∀ i ∈ NS, r ∈ R (6.3)
uTjr ≤ ∑
k∈AT ( j)
uTkrxk ≤ u¯Tjr ∀ j ∈ NT , r ∈ R (6.4)
xk ∈ {0,1} ∀ k ∈ A (6.5)
The objective function (6.1), in conjunction with constraints (6.2), minimizes the maximum
surrogate damage across all links in the selected subnetwork design. Constraints (6.3)
place lower and upper limits on the capacity utilization that the network design places on
origin nodes; constraints (6.4) are analogous for destination nodes. The user is free to
add constraints to represent more complicated logical relations among the links, but the
application to fresh-fuel shipments in the following section actually simplifies the model.
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6.2 An Application of DA1: Recontracting
This section describes applications of DA1 to reduce adversarial risk, using the fresh-fuel
subnetwork as an example. The network is modified by changing fabricator-to-power-plant
assignments (fuel-supply contracts). The construction of the realistic routes used for testing
here has already been described in Section 5.1. The appendix describes the collection and
construction of other data needed in these models.
Adversarial risk in a subnetwork can be reduced by restructuring a network so that max-
imum population across all routes is reduced. For illustrative purposes, we imagine here
that a central authority arranges all fuel-supply contracts, and any or all contracts could
be renegotiated so that, in effect, certain high-risk routes are replaced by lower-risk ones.
We require only that the total capacity utilization of a fabricator stay within ±10% of its
current capacity as estimated in the appendix, and that each power plant be assigned to one
fabricator. DA1 simplifies then as follows.
Modified data
A¯ links k ∈ A that correspond to new contracts
n¯ maximum number of new contracts
ni, n¯i respectively, the minimum and maximum number of fuel assemblies that fabri-
cation facility at i ∈ NS may produce in a year





s.t. z−dkxk ≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ A (6.7)
nSir ≤ ∑
k∈AS(i)
n j(k)xk ≤ n¯Sir ∀ i ∈ NS (6.8)
∑
k∈AT ( j)
xk = 1 ∀ j ∈ NT (6.9)
∑
k∈A¯
xk ≤ n¯ (6.10)
xk ∈ {0,1} ∀ k ∈ A (6.11)
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Using the existing contract structure defined in Table A.1, and using the single-cell “direct
attack” as defined in Section 5.1, Table 6.1 displays the maximum “affected populations”
observed along current shipping routes or “links.”
Table 6.1: Routes with the largest damage values. For example, nine routes traverse the same
road segment near Chicago, Illinois, which imposes the largest damage value of any location on
any route.
Location Chicago, IL Newark, NJ Phil., PA Wash., DC
Damage 261787 225895 218745 184547
Number of routes 9 4 1 4
Number of reactors 15 5 1 7
Using DA1-Fuel and allowing any and all business contracts to be renegotiated to minimize
adversarial risk produces the damage-surrogate results shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Largest damage values after recontracting.
Location Newark, NJ Phil., PA Wash., DC San Jose, CA
Damage 225895 218745 184547 142297
Number of routes 5 1 4 1
Number of reactors 7 1 7 2
The solution displayed in in Table 6.2 actually involves recontracting a majority of the con-
tracts, yet the overall risk for the new network only drops from 261787 to 225895. The
difficulty is this: although allowing changes in any supplier contract substantially reduces
the threat to Chicago, a large reduction is risk is impossible because of the need to transport
fuel up the east coast, through New Jersey. We add the requirement that, in order to change
a business contract, there must be a decrease in the overall risk to the for the new network.
Thus, what may be viewed as the best solution here (see details in Table 6.3) only changes
13 routes. Specifically, it eliminates the nine shipments passing through Chicago and mod-
ifies four others to reduce the maximum damage value from 261787 to 225895, the same
as the more resource-intensive solution reflected in Table 6.2. The results here show that
DA1-Fuel will allocate resources to lower damage values for the second-worst route, the
third-worst route, etc., but this extra resource does not reduce overall risk for this scenario
because the maximum damage value cannot drop below 225895.
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Table 6.3: Recontracting. Thirteen nuclear fuel supply contracts change. Additional changes to
business contracts do not lower the overall risk for the network. While avoiding Chicago, the
worst-case damage of 225895 occurs for shipments traveling on I-95 past Newark, New Jersey.
Existing Optimal
Reactor site Fabricator Damage value Fabricator Damage value
Byron Westinghouse 72781 Areva 57167
Calvert Cliffs Areva 261787 Westinghouse 52819
Comanche Peak Westinghouse 70099 Areva 70297
Davis-Besse Areva 261787 Westinghouse 49714
Millstone Areva 261787 Westinghouse 225895
North Anna Areva 261787 Westinghouse 52819
Palisades Areva 261787 GNF 65499
Palo Verde Westinghouse 92792 Areva 87050
Prairie Island Westinghouse 261787 Areva 83228
Sequoyah Westinghouse 70099 Areva 78121
Surry Areva 261787 Westinghouse 41611
Susquehanna Areva 261787 Westinghouse 41611
Three Mile Island Areva 261787 Westinghouse 64584
6.3 Simple Rerouting: A Greedy Approach
While mathematical programming can be used to address adversarial-risk reduction on a
large scale, simply rerouting the fuel shipments around the points with the largest damage
values can reduce the overall risk. A systematic “greedy algorithm” applies here, one that
is clearly optimal under certain conditions:
Step 1: Find the route with largest damage value.
Step 2: Since that implies the adversarial risk for the whole subnetwork, the damage value
for this route must be reduced to reduce overall risk.
Step 3: Assuming you have additional “rerouting resource,” reroute the link with the largest
damage value, and return to Step 1.
For the initial matrix of fuel-fabricator-to-power-plant routes, Chicago, Illinois, defines
overall risk through nine routes serving 15 reactors that traverse Interstate Highway I-94.
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With the intent to eliminate the Chicago’s damage value of 261787, we create nine alternate
routes that instead use I-74 through Champaign, Illinois. As shown in Table 6.4, worst-case
damage is reduced significantly without adding much travel distance.
Table 6.4: These routes all define the maximum damage value of 261787 in the baseline (initial)
system. To reduce overall risk by rerouting, all nine routes through Chicago must be modified
in some way. We restrict rerouting decisions to use I-74 through Champaign, Illinois. The
Millstone-Areva route now defines risk for this subnetwork because its damage value of 220173
is greatest.
Reactor site Fabricator City Damage value Extra miles
Calvert Cliffs Areva Washington, DC 90983 75
Davis-Besse Areva Toledo, OH 59027 170
Millstone Areva Bronx, NY 220173 127
North Anna Areva Indianapolis, IN 48920 44
Palisades Areva Peoria, IL 47218 384
Prairie Island Westinghouse Rockford, IL 57167 42
Surry Areva Richmond, VA 52819 28
Susquehanna Areva Indianapolis, IN 48920 151
Three Mile Island Areva Columbus, OH 72548 88
The same process repeats to eliminate the next worst-case point of attack, which are routes
that transit north on I-95 between Newark, New Jersey, and New York City. The procedure
could continue repeating for other cities until, say, a predetermined acceptable damage
level for the subnetwork is reached.
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CHAPTER 7:
DA2: REDUCING EXPECTED RISK WITH DECOY
SHIPMENTS
A solution to DA1 structures or restructures a subnetwork to minimize adversarial risk,
with risk viewed as a deterministic function. If we allow probability to come into play,
decoy shipments can be used to reduce expected risk. We are loathe to allow subjective,
uncontrollable probabilities into a model, but here the probabilities are straightforward to
compute and are under our control.
7.1 Allocating Decoys Optimally: DA2
This section uses this additional or modified notation.
xk the number of decoys assigned to each shipment on link k, 0 otherwise
x¯k a maximum value for xk (set by planners)
mk (length of link k in miles) × (number of shipments made per year on link k)
[miles/year]
m¯ total budget for decoys [miles/year]
nx maximum total number of decoys
Assumption 1: Damage on each link k ∈ A is computed as dk = f (popk) = c ·popk. That
is, damage is a linear function of population.
Focusing on a single link k, damage is computed through a function dk = f (popk). Ex-
pected damage equals damage. Suppose that for every shipment along k, we send xk
decoy shipments. The attacker has one chance to strike on this link, so assuming that a
decoy shipment is indistinguishable from a real one, the probability of a successful attack
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is 1/(1+ xk). (Note that xk is being used for a different purpose here than in previous sec-
tions.) For simplicity, we assume that a single truck carries each shipment and that any
decoy trucks follow the same route as a real shipment. The following model results.








xk ∈ {0, . . . , x¯k}∀k ∈ A |∑k∈Amkxk ≤ m¯
}
. (7.2)
Making the reasonable assumption that dk > 0 for all k ∈ A, the nonlinear model DA2-
Decoy0 has the same solution as this integer linear program:
DA2−Decoy1 (z∗)−1 = v∗ = min
x,v
v (7.3)
s.t. v ≥ d−1k · (1+ xk) ∀k ∈ A (7.4)
∑
k∈A
mkxk ≤ m¯ (7.5)
∑
k∈A
xk ≤ nx (7.6)
0 ≤ xk ≤ x¯k, integer ∀k ∈ A (7.7)
If the decoys are controlled or owned by the originating nodes i ∈ NS (suppliers), then
constraint (7.5) would simply be replaced with these constraints:
∑
k∈AS(i)
mkxk ≤ m¯i ∀ i ∈ NS, (7.8)
where m¯i denotes the number of decoy miles available at node i.
7.2 A Sample Application of Decoys
In this section, we apply DA2 to the same fuel-fabricator-to-power-plant matrix used in
previous chapters. Imagine an idealized situation in which (a) a central authority funds
decoy shipments of fresh fuel across all fabricators, (b) refueling periods are the same for
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every reactor, (c) every power-generating stations that operate multiple reactors receive a
shipment for each reactor, and (d) one mile of a decoy shipment on any route costs the same.
Because of the common refueling period and single cost, we can discuss the allocation of
“decoy miles” rather than “decoy miles per year” or “decoy dollars per year.”
The no-decoy case produces the expected damage value of 261787, which occurs for any of
the 15 shipments that pass through Chicago, Illinois, on I-94. (“Expected damage value”
is equivalent to “damage value” with no decoys.) To achieve any reduction in expected
damage, decoy-miles must be assigned to cover each of those 15 shipments. By allocating
36489 decoy miles then, the expected damage associated with an attack in Chicago drops
to 261787/2 = 130893.5, and thus expected damage is defined by the remaining maximum
damage value, which is 225895 at Newark, New Jersey. We could then determine the total
decoy miles required to cover the five shipments that pass through Newark, and further
reduce the damage value to 218745, which is the value imposed by the shipment moving
near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
This seemingly manual process of optimization can be automated by running the model
DA2 for increasing values of the resource, total decoy-miles. Table 7.1 shows how op-
timally allocated, increasing levels of decoy-miles reduce expected damage. Note how
Chicago again becomes “the long pole in the tent” once sufficient decoy miles are allo-
cated to routes passing through or near Washington, D.C. The “Chicago routes” must then
receive a second allocation of decoys to reduce expected damage further.
Table 7.1: Optimal reductions in expected damage as total decoy-miles increase.
Location Expected Decoy Max decoys Decoy miles
damage shipments per route min max
Chicago, IL 261787 0 0 0 36488
Newark, NJ 225895 15 1 36489 40567
Philadelphia, PA 218745 20 1 40568 41116
Washington, DC 184547 21 1 41117 44907
Chicago, IL 130894 28 1 44908 81396
Milwaukee, WI 115225 43 2 81397 84648
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Different authorities will have different measures of “damage” that an adversary might
cause by attacking a shipment of nuclear material within a U.S. nuclear fuel cycle. Theft
seems extremely unlikely given the great bulk of the containers used for shipping most
nuclear materials, so this thesis has focused on a “direct attack” that that causes a release of
vaporized material into the atmosphere, probably through the use of some explosive device
applied right on the shipping route. We argue that “population affected” by an attack is a
good surrogate for damage because (a) most any standard damage measure, say “economic
losses,” is likely to be monotonically increasing in population affected and (b) allocating
resources to minimize the damage surrogate will also minimize the “real” measure of worst-
case damage.
“Population affected” will certainly depend on the details of an attack, the amount of mate-
rial released, weather conditions, etc. But, we propose and justify a worst-case view of an
attack that makes calculations possible: any shipment can be successfully attacked and the
bulk of its cargo released into the environment. Although difficult to obtain, it is well within
the realm of possibility that a terrorist organization could obtain an explosive weapon that
would cause the catastrophic release of the shipment’s contents into the atmosphere.
Computing population affected involves applying standard plume models for movement of
material through the air and some model of toxicity. We do not use any actual plume model,
but demonstrate computational techniques by identifying the largest population within a
region of pre-specified size anywhere along a shipment route. We also demonstrate how
the model modifies to handle a hijacking attack in which a cargo is hijacked, moved to a
new location, and then detonated.
Given a surrogate measure of damage (i.e., an adversarial-risk-assessment method), we
then develop models to minimize worst-case damage or expected worst-case damage us-
ing limited resources. In effect, this is optimized, adversarial-risk reduction; we optimize
using sequential-game models, called “defender-attacker models.” For example, we can
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minimize the worst-case damage subject to the rerouting of a given number of shipments,
or we can minimize expected worst-case damage by applying limited decoy shipments.
Such a model could also be used to show how, for instance, increasing the number of sup-
pliers for a material could reduce risk, by replacing “dangerous routes” with less-dangerous
ones. We demonstrate these methods on a realistic model of the subnetwork that transports
fresh-fuel assemblies throughout the U.S. Fresh-fuel assemblies are not the most dangerous
material that are shipped in a nuclear fuel cycle, but the subnetwork is large and it yields
interesting case studies.
We have provided a framework for evaluating any part (subnetwork) of the transportation
network that ships nuclear materials for a U.S. nuclear fuel cycle. We have demonstrated in-
tuitively appealing results on realistic but largely artificial route data and simplified models
of the population that would be affected by the release of material. We hope that regulators,
physicists, geographers, and others who have access to actual data and expertise in the key
physical models will be able to obtain new insights into adversarial risk, and be able to help
reduce it by applying our methods.
34
Appendix: Realistic Test Data
This appendix describes how the data used in this thesis were gathered and/or generated.
We describe the collected and generated data based on our level of certainty in its accu-
racy, from “known” to “unknown,” with varying degrees of uncertainty in between. The
“knowns” are easily obtainable from a simple search on the internet, such as facility names
and their geographical coordinates. “Unknowns” are unavailable to the general public due
to their sensitive nature, such as the specific highway routes that a nuclear fuel convoy takes
between a fuel fabricator and a nuclear power station.
The data we gather and create describe the fresh-fuel shipping network.
Known: Facility locations
The facility types relevant to the fresh-fuel network are nuclear reactor fuel fabricators and
nuclear power plants. The latitude and longitude for each location are used for determining
transportation routes.
Nuclear reactor fuel fabricators
Nuclear reactor fuel is fabricated at three sites: Areva Inc., in Richland, Washington; Global
Nuclear Fuel – Americas, LLC, a joint operation of General Electric Energy, Toshiba, and
Hitachi, in Wilmington, North Carolina; and Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, in
Columbia, South Carolina.
Nuclear power plants
At the start of 2013, there were 104 nuclear reactors licensed for power generation, op-
erating on 65 different sites. In the first half of the year, four reactors at three different
sites were retired: Duke Energy’s Crystal River Nuclear Plant, shut down since September
26, 2009, announced closure on February 5, 2013; Dominion Resources’ Kewaunee Power
Station, announced closure on October 22, 2012, and shut down on May 7, 2013; and
Southern California Edison’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (two reactors), shut
down since January 31, 2012, announced closure on June 7, 2013. Constellation/Exelon’s
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (two reactors) and Entergy’s James A. FitzPatrick Nu-
clear Power Plant share the same site in Scriba, New York. PSEG Nuclear’s Hope Creek
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Nuclear Generating Station (two reactors) and Salem Nuclear Generating Station share the
same site in Hancock’s Bridge, New Jersey.
We use the latitude and longitude coordinates for each power plant location, as well as
the number of reactors at each station. A total of 100 nuclear reactors are operating at 62
independently licensed sites.
Partly known: Fabricator capacities
According to the World Nuclear Association, the production capacities of light water reac-
tor (LWR) fuel, in metric tons per year, are: Areva’s Richland facility, 1200; Global Nuclear
Fuel’s Wilmington facility, 750; and Westinghouse’s Columbia facility, 1500 [33]. Assum-
ing no import or export of nuclear fuel rods or assemblies, we convert these capacities to a
percentage of total fabrication capacity: Areva, 35%; GNF, 22%; and Westinghouse, 43%.
The number of reactors supplied by a fuel fabricator is divided by the total number of reac-
tors in operation to determine the fuel fabricator’s capacity percentage. These percentages
are used as “goals” when considering how many reactors each fabricator can supply. Dif-
ferences in rated reactor thermal output (in MWt) or actual refueling mass (in kg) are not
considered when assigning a shipment demand to a fuel fabricator.
Partly known: Fuel fabricator to power-plant assignments
News releases on the awarding of fuel-supply contracts establish some actual fabricator-
to-power-plant assignments. For facilities for which we could not find contracting an-
nouncements, we make assumptions based on the type of reactor and the owner/operator
corporation, ensuring the total assignments to each fabricator are close to that fabricator’s
percent capacity. It is important to note that, while the corporations involved in the nu-
clear fuel supply chain may choose to provide news releases pertaining to their business
endeavors, we find relatively few actual notices of fabricator/power-plant contracts, so the
assignments we use are substantially notional.
Table A.1 shows the notional business contract structure used in computational tests.
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Table A.1: Partly hypothetical fuel-fabricator-to-power-plant assignments, with number of re-
actors at each power plant. These assignments define the baseline fresh-fuel subnetwork in
computational tests.
Fabricator Nuclear station Reactors Fabricator Nuclear station Reactors
Areva Arkansas Nuc. One 2 GNF Oyster Creek 1
Areva Browns Ferry 3 GNF Peach Bottom 2
Areva Brunswick 2 GNF Perry 1
Areva Calvert Cliffs 2 GNF Pilgrim 1
Areva Catawba 2 GNF River Bend 1
Areva Davis-Besse 1 GNF Vermont Yankee 1
Areva Dresden 2 Westinghouse Beaver Valley 2
Areva Fort Calhoun 1 Westinghouse Braidwood 2
Areva McGuire 2 Westinghouse Byron 2
Areva Millstone 2 Westinghouse Callaway 1
Areva Monticello 1 Westinghouse Comanche Peak 2
Areva North Anna 2 Westinghouse D.C. Cook 2
Areva Oconee 3 Westinghouse Diablo Canyon 2
Areva Palisades 1 Westinghouse Farley 2
Areva Quad Cities 2 Westinghouse Ginna 1
Areva Robinson 1 Westinghouse Hope Creek 1
Areva Shearon Harris 1 Westinghouse Indian Point 2
Areva Surry 2 Westinghouse Palo Verde 3
Areva Susquehanna 2 Westinghouse Point Beach 2
Areva Three Mile Island 1 Westinghouse Prairie Island 2
GNF Clinton 1 Westinghouse Salem 2
GNF Columbia 1 Westinghouse Seabrook 1
GNF Cooper 1 Westinghouse Sequoyah 2
GNF Duane Arnold 1 Westinghouse South Texas 2
GNF Fermi 1 Westinghouse St. Lucie 2
GNF FitzPatrick 1 Westinghouse Summer 1
GNF Grand Gulf 1 Westinghouse Turkey Point 2
GNF Hatch 2 Westinghouse Vogtle 2
GNF LaSalle 2 Westinghouse Waterford 1
GNF Limerick 2 Westinghouse Watts Bar 1
GNF Nine Mile Point 2 Westinghouse Wolf Creek 1
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Largely unknown: Routing of fuel shipments
We cannot identify appropriate, approved HAZMAT routes that are used for a shipping nu-
clear fuel, except in a few states that publish detailed information. Therefore, for simplicity
and consistency, we use the “Get Directions” feature in Google Earth to produce a trans-
portation route from each fuel fabricator to each of its assigned “customers.” Each route
is based on fastest travel time, so this places shipments mostly on high-capacity highways
and interstate freeways, which seems to be realistic.
To demonstrate “realistic,” consider the Google Earth route from from Areva to Arkansas
Nuclear One as it passes through the state of Colorado, shown by a heavy dark line in Fig-
ure A.1. The Colorado Department of Public Safety publishes a map of roads approved for
shipping hazardous materials, and the roads colored green in Figure A.2 are those approved
for nuclear materials [34]. Note that the Google Earth route follows the Colorado-approved
roads fairly closely, with the only difference being that the Google Earth route avoids Den-
ver’s city center.
Figure A.1: Google Earth routing from Areva to Arkansas Nuclear One as it transits Colorado,
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Figure A.2: Colorado hazardous and nuclear materials route restrictions. Approved nuclear
materials routes are shown in green. A shipment from Areva to Arkansas Nuclear One might
take the route that is highlighted in black over the approved nuclear materials routes on I-25
and I-70. Along with Figure A.1, this demonstrates that the fastest-path routing from Google
gives a partial route that is plausible given HAZMAT road restrictions. After [34].
Unknown: Total population affected by a worst-case attack
As a surrogate for worst-case damage that could be incurred along a link in a subnetwork,
we have proposed “the population affected.” Of course, exact calculations of this will
depend on the subnetwork, the material being shipped, and other factors. A reasonable ap-
proximation of population affected at a point location would be the population in a circular
region of given area centered about that point. Erkut and Verter [14] discuss a “danger
circle” as a simplification of a PRA approach to transportation of HAZMAT. To avoid
complicated geographical calculations, we assume that
1. A grid is laid across the region of interest, with each (roughly) square region corre-
sponding to a quadrilateral formed by the cell’s latitude and longitude, and
2. Only the population of a grid square would be affected by an attack in that square.
Thus, dk for link k may be computed by identifying all squares that intersect the corre-
sponding route and recording the maximum population among those.
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To demonstrate, we use the populations from the database called “Gridded Population of
the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid” [28]. This database provides
populations from the 2000 U.S. Census, adjusted to match U.N. totals. The grid resolution
is 2.5 arc-minutes per square or “cell.” The population is corrected as a function of area
affected, as described in Section 5.1.
Route coordinates are computed as described above so that route-block intersections are
straightforward to establish. The length of each route, used elsewhere, is computed during
this process, also. For the hypothetical fresh-fuel subnetwork, Table 5.1 displays the ten
routes with highest potential damage. Chapter 5 also describes how this model modifies to
handle worst-case attacks that would release material over a larger area than a single cell
and how it extends to hijacking attacks.
Data for other subnetworks
We include a discussion of other data that might be used for evaluating adversarial risks in
subnetworks we do not consider.
Uranium Enrichment
Domestic enrichment of uranium occurs at two sites: United States Enrichment Corpora-
tion’s gaseous diffusion plant, in Paducah, Kentucky, and URENCO USA’s gas centrifuge
enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico. Enriched uranium hexafluoride is shipped to
each of the three fuel fabrication sites. An application of the recontracting model of Sec-
tion 6.2, while initially seeming overly simplistic given only two supply nodes, could be
more significant if additional uranium enrichment sites are built, or if one considers the
ports of entry of imported enriched uranium. Simple rerouting using the “greedy algo-
rithm,” as shown in Section 6.3, could easily be applied to this small subnetwork. The
decoy model of Chapter 7 could be employed here, if a correction factor were applied to
the damage surrogate that accounts for the change in anticipated severity of an attack on a
uranium hexafluoride shipping cask when compared to an attack on a fresh fuel assembly
cask. An application of the recontracting model would require building additional uranium
enrichment sites or considering the ports of entry of imported enriched uranium.
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Mixed Oxide Fuel
A MOX fuel production facility is under construction at DoE’s Savannah River Site, in
Aiken, South Carolina. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has expressed interest in
using MOX fuel. TVA operates the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant (three reactors), near
Athens, Alabama; Sequoyah Nuclear Generating Station (two reactors), near Soddy-Daisy,
Tennessee; and Watts Bar Nuclear Generating Station, near Spring City, Tennessee. Unless
domestic production of MOX fuel increases to multiple sites, the recontracting model will
not apply. Similar to the uranium-enrichment case, simple rerouting could be employed, as
well as the decoy model, provided a correction factor is applied to the damage function.
Spent Fuel to Repository
No repository exists in the U.S., but the issues surrounding such shipments have been well
studied during the failed attempt to create a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; for
example, see Riddle et al. [35]. Standard rail shipments of heavy casks would probably
apply here making analysis fairly easy.
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